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It is the normal business of our Annual Meeting to lay plans for the
future besides taking stock of past accomplishments. We share a com-
mon faith in the power of economic research to better human life, but
the specific inquiries that we pursue require constant scrutiny and re-
examination. At a time when our nation is mobilizing its spiritual and
economic resources to protect its way of life against the sinister force
of communism, the need for critical self-appraisal is especially strong.
To aid you in making this appraisal, I shall discuss the National Bu-
reau's program in relation to some of the practical issues of our times,
and suggest the general direction in which the Bureau may usefully
move in the years ahead.
I
The distribution of the national income is always a vital concern of a
free and progressive people seeking to raise their plane of living. The
wage bargains into which we enter, the prices and taxes we pay, the
subsidies we legislate, even the careers we choose, are all affected in
some degree by our notions of what is a 'fair' income. These notions
are naturally linked to our impressions of how incomes are actually dis-
tributed, but on this subject we have been very badly informed. Our
direct knowledge of incomes is of necessity limited to a few cases. For
the rest we rely on vague impressions gathered over the years, eked out
by crude statistics that occasionally come to our notice. As a result few
Americans and still fewer Europeans are aware of the transformation
in the distribution of our national income that has occurred within the
past twenty years—a transformation that has been carried out peace-
*Thispaper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Board of Directors of
the National Bureau, held February 26, 1951. I am deeply indebted to Geoffrey
H. Moore for his advice and assistance, especially on Parts 2 and 3 of this report.
[3fully and gradually, but which may already be counted as one of the
great social revolutions of history.
Let me cite several figures from Simon Kuzncts' recent reworking
of income statistics. In 1929 the highest 5 per cent of the income re-
cipients obtained 34 per cent of the total disposable income of indi-
viduals—that is, the total of personal incomes, inclusive of any capital
gains but after deducting federal income tax payments. By 1939 their
share had dropped to 27 per cent of total income, and by 1946 to 18
per cent. Since 1946 the size structure of the income distribution does
not seem to have changed materially, so that we may regard the dis-
tribution in that year as roughly representative of current conditions.
If we now compare 1929 and 1946, we find that the share going to the
top 5 per cent group declined 16 points. Had perfect equality of in-
comes been attained in 1946 the share would have dropped from 34
to 5 per cent, that is, by 29 points. In other words, the income share of
the top 5 per cent stratum dropped 16 points out of a maximum pos-
sible drop of 29 points; so that, on the basis of this yardstick, we may
be said to have traveled in a bare two decades over half the distance
separating the 1929 distribution from a perfectly egalitarian distribu-
tion. If we turn to the top 1 instead of the top 5 per cent group, the
results are still more striking. The share of the top 1 per cent group in
total income was 19.1 per cent in 1929 and 7.7 per cent in 1946. Since
the share of this group dropped 11.4 points out of a total possible drop
of 18.1 points, we have traveled since 1929 on the basis of this yard-
stick almost two-thirds of the distance towards absolute income equal-
ity.1Regrettably, the 'iron curtain' precludes comparison of our
achievement with that of the vaunted 'people's democracies', but it is
permissible to wonder whether many of them can point to so vast a
democratization of the distributive process in their own countries.
Considerable income inequalities still exist in our midst, but they re-
1The above figures are derived from Kuznets' report, "Shares of Upper Income
Groups in Income and Savings", now being prepared for publication. For a pre-
liminary summary of his findings, see Occasional Paper 35 (National Bureau,
1950). Of course, the figures cited in the text refer to only two points on a Lorenz
curve, and cannot be interpreted to mean that 'income inequality', taken as a
whole, has been reduced by over half. Moreover, Kuznets' figures arc estimates
that may be modified by later research; though it seems unlikely that the trend
indicated by the figures would be materially changed, as long as the income con-
cept is confined to personal incomes. If, however, the undistributed income of cor-
porations were allocated to individuals, the change from 1929 to 1946 would be
less striking. On this basis the share of the top 5 per cent group comes out 35 per
cent in 1929 and 20 per Cent in while the share of the top 1 per cent comes
out 20.8 per cent in 1929 and 9.9 per cent in 1946.
4]quire careful interpretation. Imagine a static society in which differ-
ences of earnings simply reflect differences in productivity; hence
youngsters earn less than middle-aged men, and men with no schooling
receive less than those possessing a technical education. Imagine fur-
ther that real incomes are independent of location, but that both the
scale of living costs and money incomes are higher in urban than in
rural areas. To an uninformed observer the income differences of such
a society might seem disturbing, although age and education, each cor-
related with productivity, account for all real differences in income.
We lack the means to assess precisely the influence of the various fac-
tors that shape our current income distribution, but the data assembled
by Kuznets leave no doubt that a part of the income differentials in
our society is attributable to urban life; that the upper income stratum
is dominated by the most productive age, sex, and educational groups
in the population; and that income inequality would appear smaller if
incomes were reckoned by two- or three-year periods instead of by the
year.
These conclusions of Kuznets' investigation have great significance
for the American people. If we are to look forward constructively to a
material reduction of income inequalities in the future, we must seek
to attain it principally by raising the productivity of those at the bot-
tom of the income scale rather than by transferring income from the
rich to the poor. Between 1929 and 1946 the average per capita in-
come of our population (including capital gains but after payment of
federal income taxes) rose from 690 to 1,166 dollars. Meanwhile the
average per capita income of the top 1 per cent of the population fell
from 13,168 to 8,994 dollars.2 Thus the upper income stratum suffered
a substantial decline in money income and a still larger decline in real
income. The social experimentation of our own and other countries
suggests that private incentives to embark on new and venturesome in-
vestments are more firmly rooted than was generally believed to be the
case a quarter of a century or even a decade ago; but there can be no
doubt that as high incomes are cut, a point must come when private
investors have neither the will nor the power to launch major inno-
vations. Substantial further redistribution of incomes may therefore
affect adversely the size of the national income, while it cannot im-
prove appreciably the living conditions of the great masses. The para-
mount source of the rising living standards of our workers and farmers
has always been an increasing volume of production, and in the years
ahead it bids fair to become the only source.
2See the preceding note.
[5II
The evening out of incomes is partly attributable to the rapid rise of
wages relatively to other forms of income—salaries, dividends, and in-
terest receipts. Another significant factor has been the progressive in-
come tax, which now dominates the federal revenue system.3 Lawrence
Seltzer's investigation discloses that the income actually subject to tax
grew three times as rapidly as total personal income between 1939 and
1948. At the same time tax rates rose sharply, so that tax payments
grew twice as fast as income subject to tax. As a consequence of both
developments, personal income tax payments increased six times as fast
as personal incomes. The relative increase of tax revenues was still
higher by 1950, and will be higher again in 1951 even if Congress ac-
cepts only partly the President's recommendations. The precise charac-
ter of the additional taxes is as yet uncertain, but the raw facts on in-
come distribution make it altogether plain that the burden will fall
mainly on moderate-sized incomes. Even if the total income of those
receiving $25,000 or more per year were paid into the Treasury, the
addition to tax revenues would fall far short of the additional sums
now budgeted.
The only way the government can avoid sharp increases in taxes is
to finance all or a substantial part of the new military expenditures by
borrowing. But experience teaches that this method of financing is
nearly certain to impose greater hardships on the average citizen than
would increased taxation. For, on the one hand, financial tinkering
cannot of itself change the physical quantity of goods available for ci-
vilian consumption; while, on the other, debt financing will lead to a
further shrinking of our shrunken dollar, and thus further obliterate
the savings that ordinary folk had laid by in the form of bank deposits,
government bonds, pension accounts, and life insurance holdings. It is
often noted that inflation hurts the lender and benefits the borrower,
but it is easy to overlook that men of small or moderate means are far
more apt to be net lenders than net borrowers. The principal bor-
rowers, of course, are governments, large business firms, and wealthy
individuals.
Whether the government obtains the dollars it needs by taxing or
borrowing or doing some of each, it will use the dollars to purchase a
larger portion of the national output than it did previously. Hence, un-
less production increases or inventories are permitted to fall to danger-
ous levels, the quantity of goods left for purchase by civilian users must
decline. In a period when industry is converting plant from peacetime
See Seltzer's note on "The Individual Income Tax" in Part 3 of this report.
6]to military production, an overall increase in output per manhour is
not very likely to occur. Absorption of the unemployed into gainful oc-
cupations will tend to relieve the short supplies; but the contribution
from this source will hardly be sufficient to offset the projected increase
in military forces. An increase in the labor force and a lengthening of
working hours are therefore the principal means that are immediately
available for attaining the military goods we need without severe cur-
tailment of living standards.
Clarence Long's investigation of changes in the labor supply during
recent decades in the United States and foreign countries throws con-
siderable light on the elasticity of the labor force—a total that includes
civilian workers, the armed forces, and the unemployed who are ac-
tively in the labor market. The labor force is normally one of the steadi-
est of economic factors, but it is nevertheless capable of increasing very
sharply at a time of national emergency. During the 1930's the annual
additions to our labor force were in the neighborhood of 600,000. Be-
tween 1940 and 1944, however, the total increase was close to 10 mil-
lion, or about four times what it would have been under normal con-
ditions. Over half of the 'extra' workers were girls and women, and
most of them left industry at the end of the war. When the conflict in
Korea broke out last June, the proportion of the population of work-
ing age in the labor force was not much higher than in 1940. Now the
proportion is perceptibly rising again, and it seems likely that the gen-
eral pattern of the recent war will be repeated in the present emer-
gency.
Long's analysis of foreign experience during World War II is not
less instructive than his analysis of the American record. The British
augmented their labor force on approximately the same scale as the
United States, when allowance is made for the difference in size of the
two countries. Canada also added substantially to its labor force; Ger-
many, on the other hand, fell far behind the democracies. According
to Long's calculations, "to every hundred females who would have
worked gainfully under high employment conditions, the United States
added 28 girls and women, Britain 26, Canada 13, and Germany lost
1. To every 100 males, this country and Canada added 7, Britain
roughly 3, and Germany under The great contrast between the
German experience and that of the democracies has many causes, but
perhaps the most important is that a free and peaceful people have a
resilience and energy at a time of crisis that cannot be matched by a
dictatorial state. Yearsbefore launching an attack, a totalitarian gov-
Long's note on "The Supply of Labor" in Part 3 of this report.
[7ernment is likely to drive its citizens to fanatical effort, but the furious
pace cannot be maintained physically or psychologically if the conflict
turns out to be a protracted one. There is a nice balance in the energy
of a people over a run of years that moral fervor may stretch but can-
not override. To build up our military strength we must now act boldly
and quickly, and yet guard against the danger of draining the reserves
of energy we shall need if our country is forced into full-scale war.
In view of the magnitude of our military program, a considerable
expansion of the labor force during the next year or two is as desirable
as it is likely. A moderate increase in working hours would also con-
tribute to smoothing the transition to a sharply higher level of govern-
mental spending. But over a longer run we must seek to protect living
standards by looking to increases in the productivity of labor rather
than to an extension of working hours or a rise in the proportion of
people in the labor force. The American people will willingly work
harder for the same or even a lower real income while our most urgent
defense preparations are being built up, but they are not likely to con-
tinue to do that—unless, of course, the Korean war is extended. If the
rightful aspirations of workers and farmers for better living standards
are to be realized with a minimum of social unrest, it will be necessary
to strive for even greater increases in productivity than have ruled in
the past.
The extent and causes of increasing industrial productivity have long
occupied the attention of the National Bureau's research staff. The in-
vestigations now being conducted by Mills, Fabricant, Stigler, and
Barger will probably be completed within a year or two, and it is highly
important to begin laying plans for new research in this critical area.
But it is only prudent to assume that whatever gains may occur in in-
dustrial productivity during the next decade, controversy over the dis-
tribution of the national product will not be less intense than in the re-
cent past. New research on the distribution of incomes therefore seems
advisable, and it is likely to prove especially fruitful if linked with Wol-
man's and Long's studies of the labor market. Kuznets' work on in-
come distribution, invaluable though it is, has covered intensively only
the upper income strata. Fortunately, a great deal of information on
low and moderate incomes has recently accumulated and awaits ex-
ploitation. Preliminary explorations suggest that it may be possible to
work out tolerably full income distributions for every year since 1939,
and to cross the size distributions with other classifications among which
occupation, trade union status, and full- or part-time membership in
the labor force are especially important. Statistics on income analyzed
in this fashion would clarify the economic policies that have ruled in
8]recent years, and at the same time provide a better factual basis on
which current policies may be formulated. I hope that the Board will
authorize research in this direction as soon as funds and personnel can
be assembled.
III
At an early stage of World War II Leonard Crum began an investiga-
tion of the outlook for the postwar federal budget, in which he was
later joined by Slade Kendrick. Their successive estimates were widely
discussed and had considerable influence on students of government,
but they rested on so many uncertain assumptions—especially with re-
gard to the state of international affairs—that the authors were re-
luctant to have them published. Recalling this experiment, it is espe-
cially noteworthy that back in 1943, when the thinking of so many was
still geared to the 1930's, Crum foresaw that the postwar federal budget
would run on a very much higher level than any prewar budget.
Crum reached his conclusion by examining individual items of the
budget, taking such account as he could of the probable needs and
political pressures after the war. Recently, in the course of an historical
study of federal expenditures, Kendrick gave close attention to the in-
fluence of major wars and in the process succeeded in lifting Crum's
conclusion to the plane of generalization.5 After the War of 1812, after
the Civil War, after World War I, and again after World War II,
federal expenditures ran on a substantially higher level than in the
years preceding hostilities. Of course, a large gap between prewar and
postwar expenditures might merely mean that traditional methods of
war financing have a powerful tendency to lift price levels. But Ken-
drick demonstrates that the gap is not a monetary illusion; it remains
very substantial even after allowing for population growth and rising
incomes, besides changes in the purchasing power of money. This per-
sistent pattern arises, at least in part, from readily identifiable causes
—such as heavy borrowing during a war which piles up embarrassing
interest charges at the war's end, the need to care for veterans and
their families, and a natural tendency to countenance what seem to be
moderate increases in outlay on civilian functions at a time when mili-
tary budgets are being drastically cut. Thus, although the bulge of war
spending is followed by sharp contraction at the war's end, the level
of expenditures remains considerably higher than before the war.
5Kendrick's note on "Federal Expenditures for 150 Years" in Part 3 of this
report.
[9Whether and in what degree this pattern will apply to the present
bulge in governmental spending is a question that cannot be answered
with assurance. War with Russia is by no means inevitable. Some ap-
proach to international comity within the near future cannot be ruled
out. Further, the pattern depends on factors that are in considerable
degree within human control even if the calamity of war cannot be
averted. It is therefore premature to conclude that when full peace
reigns again, the rate of governmental expenditures will be substan-
tially higher relatively to population and national income than in the
past three or four years. At the same time it is well to recognize that
apart from wars the broad trend of governmental expenditures has
been emphatically upward. Fabricant's study, now approaching com-
pletion, reveals persistent growth in the utilization of human and mate-
rial resources by government. Between 1900 and 1949 private employ-
ment in the United States approximately doubled, the combined em-
ployment of state and local governments quadrupled, while federal
employment increased more than twelvefold. One out of twenty-four
workers was on some governmental payroll in 1900; the proportion
rose to one out of fifteen in 1920, one out of eleven in 1940, one out of
eight in 1949. In 1902 one out of every thirteen or fourteen dollars of
capital assets (excluding military equipment) was government prop-
erty; in 1946 the proportion became one out of four. Nor do these
striking figures tell the full tale, since they leave out of account the
employment provided and the capital utilized through governmental
purchases from private business, which in the aggregate add very mate-
rially to the command of real resources.6
It is interesting to speculate on what the trend of governmental ac-
tivity might have been in the complete absence of wars. From this
point of view, it is well that the figures I have cited on employment are
imperceptibly affected by interest on the federal debt or by outlays on
the veterans' program, both being predominantly legacies of war. The
figures do include the military forces and the civilian workers employed
by government in connection with the military establishment. If these
were omitted, governmental employment would be notably lower but
the broad trend would be unchanged. The crux of the problem, how-
ever, is the indirect influence of war on the civilian functions of gov-
ernment, and on this matter it is difficult to touch firm ground. It does
seem clear that the domestic and international dislocations caused by
6Fabricant's full report will probably not be published before next year. See
his preliminary report, "The Rising Trend of Government Employment", Occa-
sional Paper 29 (June 1949) in the National Bureau's series.
101war extend the need for governmental activity, and it is not unlikely
that once government undertakes a new function there is a tendency
to maintain it even if underlying conditions change. Not only that, but
the decisive role of government in conducting a war probably fosters
a tendency on the part of many to look to government for a solution of
their special problems. But these and other indirect influences of war,
important though they may be, can account only in part for the in-
creasing role of government in economic life.
The broad trend of development in a progressive economy is towards
sharply increasing emphasis on the service industries, and the govern-
ment is merely one of the major channels through which the public's
demand for services is satisfied. An economy undergoing rapid indus-
trialization and urbanization increases the interdependence of men—
their exposure to the wisdom and enterprise, also the folly and in-
dolence, of their neighbors. Social and economic problems arise that
cannot be handled adequately by private enterprise. With the spread
of political democracy the demand increases for collective action to
broaden educational opportunity, to improve sanitation and health,
reduce slums, conserve natural resources, eliminate or regulate private
monopoly, supervise banks and insurance companies, protect workers
against the hazards of unemployment, and so on. Thus the line sepa-
rating private enterprise and governmental responsibility is constantly
redrawn, the range of governmental activities broadens, and a 'mixed
economy' comes into being.
In these few sentences I have touched on one of the gravest prob-
lems of our time—namely, the proper line of division between the
functions of government and private enterprise. This has always been
a controversial issue in our democracy, and every significant relocation
of the line has been preceded and followed by extensive public dis-
cussion. What makes the problem so acute today is that despite the
notable shift toward government in recent years, Americans feel that
new changes are impending—the scope and consequences of which
they can but dimly foresee. Over a large part of the earth collectivism
has triumphed, and even in the democracies of Western Europe the
government is a more significant economic factor than in the United
States. To make social changes intelligently amidst the uncertainty bred
of crisis and tumult in the world is not easy. But that very fact imposes
a heavy obligation on economists to clarify and set out scientifically the
extent, character, and impact of governmental activities.
The National Bureau's research in this area dates formally from 1939
when the Conference on Research in Fiscal Policy was set up. In the
last two years our research on fiscal problems has been accelerated.
[11Several investigators—Seltzer, Kendrick, Maxwell, Lent, Holland, and
Dobrovoisky—now have in hand important research concerning fed-
eral finances and state-federal fiscal relations. But in our experience
'public finance' or 'fiscal policy' is a subject that cannot usefully be
kept in a box by itself. The major projects on which the National Bu-
reau has worked—that is, our investigations of national income, money
flows, capital requirements, the credit system, business cycles, and em-
ployment and productivity—have attempted to cover, each in its own
image, the operations of the economy as a whole. So large a factor as
government inevitably obtrudes itself in such inquiries, and our ic-
search staff has been alive to the opportunity. Kuznets' papers on in-
come originating in governmental activity, presented to the Conference
on Research in Income and Wealth; Copeland's paper "Concerning a
New Federal Financial Statement"; Stigler's paper "Employment and
Compensation in Education"; Fabricant's monograph on trends in the
government's use of resources, of which a preview was published as
Occasional Paper 29; Wolman's Planning and Control of Public Works
and Gayer's Public Works in Prosperity and Depression; Firestone's
current study of cyclical fluctuations in federal revenues; Coppock's
Government Agencies of Consumer Instalment Credit; Colean's re-
cently published volume, The Impact of Government on Real Estate
Finance in the United States; Harriss' History and Policies of the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation which is ready for press; Copeland's
new investigation of the capital used by government—every one of
these studies has grown out of a major project concerned with the over-
all operations of the economic system, and each has aided and will con-
tinue to aid the more specialized inquiries in public finance.
Thus government operations have for some time been a large factor
in the Bureau's research program. It would be well, however, to give
them greater prominence by making the expanding role of govenment
one of the high themes of our research in the years immediately ahead.
The Executive Committee has recently taken one step in this direction
by requesting Saulnier to organize a comprehensive investigation of the
entire field of governmental lending, including federal loan guarantees
and loan insurance. A still more important step is the authorization of
a study of international trends in the governmental use of resources.
Both in Europe and in the United States discussions of governmental
activity, especially of the socialization of industry, have hitherto been
carried on without the aid of basic measurements, and great confusion
and suspicion have unhappily been wrought in the process. Hence the
projected study will have as its first aim the development of detailed
and accurate information on governmental employment of men and
12]other resources in each of the leading countries of Western Europe
since 1900. Thus a factual foundation may be laid for comparing
European trends with those set out by Fabricant in his American study.
But it would be desirable to go further and search for the causes of
international similarities and differences in the economic role accorded
by free peoples to their governments. Such a comparative study would
help everyone concerned with large affairs, whether on the theoretical
or practical level, to see developments in our own and other countries
in clearer perspective.
To carry out this broad and fundamental investigation properly will
require larger funds than we have in hand, but we shall at least get the
project launched through an exploratory survey by Abramovitz. What
makes the project enticing to the economic student is the prospect that
it will open up an array of problems concerning not only government,
but economic development at large. To derive information on govern-
mental employment it will be desirable, if not strictly necessary, to work
out occupational tables for each country covered. Thus materials of
very great significance for a study of comparative economic develop-
ment will come into being, and perhaps pave the way for wide-ranging
investigations of the conditions of economic progress. But it is much
too early to say whether we shall be led in this way or by some other
route into extending the modest international studies we are now pur-
suing.
Iv
I have emphasized the operations of government because of the stra-
tegic role they have come to occupy in the modern economy. The gov-
ernment, however, is merely one agency in the complicated process by
which the citizens of a democracy obtain their living. The figures on
governmental employment, which I cited earlier, would have appeared
less striking had I observed that 96 per cent of Americans were pri-
vately employed in 1900 and that, despite the growing complexity of
economic life and our participation in two major wars, as many as
88 per cent continued to be privately employed in 1949. Even during
World War II, federal income payments at no time reached a fourth
of the national total, although the government's payroll was swollen
by over 11 million in the armed forces. Of course, these figures convey
little concerning government's regulatory functions, but these too must
not be exaggerated. By and large, except in times of the gravest na-
tional emergency, the predominant mass of economic decisions con-
cerned with choice of occupation, industrial location, production, pric-
[13ing, saving, investing, financing, working, buying, and selling has re-
mained in private hands; though, to be sure, it has become necessary
for everyone to function within an expanded framework of govern-
mental rules.
Under the impact of economic mobilization such as we are now fac-
ing, it is possible to form the impression that the size of the national
income, its physical composition, and the manner in which we share
it are all determined by some will of government. In fact, the end
results of our economic activity depend both in times of peace and in
times of war on actions taken by millions of workers and farmers, house-
holds, business firms, financial institutions of various sorts, trade unions,
farmers' cooperatives, businessmen's associations, and state and local
governments, besides the federal government. Our vast economy is
essentially a partnership. In an emergency like the present, the federal
government becomes the dominant partner. But while there are many
silent as well as quarrelsome partners in the joint enterprise, none is
dormant—not even in wartime.
The gains registered over the last two decades by our joint enter-
prise have been many and substantial. The combined output of our
factories, mines, utility plants, and construction yards is now about
twice what it was in 1929. The production of the service industries has
increased enormously, and even agricultural production has expanded
about 40 per cent. The gain in population has been 25 per cent, in the
physical volume of personal consumption nearly 75 per cent. The glar-
ing inequalities of our income structure have in large degree been
eliminated. We have devised a tolerably comprehensive system of in-
surance against the hazards of bank failure, unemployment, and an
indigent old age. And we have shared the fruits of our industry and
knowledge with the peoples of less fortunate nations, including our
former enemies, on a scale that is probably unique in the annals of
history.
These are great moral as well as economic achievements. They de-
serve more attention than they have received from the American peo-
ple, and they deserve vastly more attention from the peoples of other
nations. But if the performance of the American economy is imperfectly
understood, the reason is partly that our record is not free from blemish.
Despite our great economic strength, we have failed to exercise the
leadership needed to restore that measure of free international trade
under which the world once prospered and enjoyed substantial peace.
Nor have we as yet proved ourselves capable of conducting our econ-
omy without serious oscillations. Within the past twenty years we have
lived through one of the greatest inflations of money and prices in our
14]history, also one of the severest depressions, besides smaller movements
that were sufficient to cause anxiety not only to us but to the friendly
peoples of Europe.
The view has gained some currency of late, as it has in other periods
of exaltation, that economic institutions and knowledge have developed
to the point where the government can readily prevent sizable eco-
nomic fluctuations. This view can be supported by reciting the impres-
sive contracyclical devices that have been built into our fiscal system.
Recent price history, on the other hand, casts some doubt on the ex-
pectation, and so too does the longer perspective of history. Govern-
ment policy with respect to booms and depressions is not an innovation
of the Employment Act of 1946 or of the Roosevelt administration.7
it can be traced to the depression of the 1890's, and indeed much
earlier. At the beginning of the century the objective of policy was to
prevent financial crises, such as occurred in 1893 and 1907. After the
violent monetary disturbances of 1915-21 interest shifted to the stabili-
zation of the price level in the hope that if price gyrations could be
avoided, the economy would move forward without any serious set-
back. When mass unemployment developed during the 1930's, the goal
of a stable dollar was abandoned, and the objective of policy became
full employment. Once unemployment was wiped out, price move-
ments and industrial productivity became a serious concern. Emphasis
subtly shifted from 'full employment' to 'a high and stable level of em-
ployment' or to 'economic growth and stability'. Recently, the primary
goal of government policy has been maximum production rather than
employment, and so it will undoubtedly continue to be for some time.
But if the price inflation of recent years extends into the next decade,
the clock of policy may eventually turn back to the 1920's when the
prima:ry emphasis was on a dollar of stable purchasing power.
The shifting emphasis of our economic policies has, of course, re-
flected a continual effort to adjust to changing conditions and newly
emerging problems. Underlying the effort there has been a growing
understanding of the character and mechanism of economic fluctua-
tions. Men seriously concerned with governmental policies have been
feeling their way slowly towards a goal of balanced economic growth.
The goal cannot be expressed in a simple formula because simple for-
mulas have not conformed well to the abiding values of the American
people or because they have brought new problems in the process of
7 RobertWarren, "Twenty-five Years of Monetary Controls", in Economic
Research and the Development of Economic Science and Public Policy (National
Bureau, 1946).
[15dealing with the old. But the goal would probably include at least the
following objectives: a high and steady volume of employment rela-
tively to the size of the labor force, a high and steadily rising volume of
production of goods that people wish to have, a high and steadily ris-
ing volume of imports on which the hopes of the outside world are
pinned, a fairly stable level of consumer goods prices for people at
every income level, and a minimal use of direct controls over prices and
incomes. The conditions needed for realizing such a goal of 'balanced
economic growth' are still obscure, and much experimentation may be
needed before it is approximated. But the chances of success will be
improved as the boundaries of objective knowledge of the interlocking
processes of our economic system are extended. The National Bureau's
studies of business cycles have been guided by this aim. They have al-
ready yielded results of practical value, but a vast amount of funda-
mental research on the pervasive problem of economic instability re-
mains to be done.
In last year's report I presented some important facts on business
cycles that have emerged from recent studies by Mitchell, Moore,
Abramovitz, Hultgren, Saulnier, use Mintz, and myself. I explained
that our research on the typical characteristics of business cycles was
sufficiently advanced to justify closer attention to the differences among
the cyclical movements thrown up by history, and urged "investigation
of the problem why some business declines remain mild while others
reach catastrophic magnitude". Tentative plans for such an investiga-
tion have been drafted, and they are designed to handle expansions of
varying degrees of intensity as well as contractions. From this matrix
it would be desirable to single out two special studies for early atten-
tion. One would compare the patterns of economic change during war
cycles with peacetime patterns—a comparison that might prove par-
ticularly helpful if the present phase of near-war economy stretched
out, as it may, over a considerable number of years. The second study
would analyze quantitatively the impact of inflation on incomes and
prices, the efficiency of production, and the distribution of wealth. In
the course of the Bureau's research on prices and business cycles, a
great deal of information has been accumulated on inflationary epi-
sodes in our own and other countries. Considerable research would
still be required to round out the empirical record on inflation and to
analyze its ramified economic effects; but there are strong forces in
our economy working towards secular inflation, and a thorough inves-
tigation of the subject might have a salutary influence on the course
of events.
The problem of reestablishing confidence among the nations of the
16]world is more important even than the problem of economic stability,
but the two are not unrelated. The view is widely held by Europeans
that the United States is responsible for major shifts in their economic
fortunes; and for this reason, if for no other, it is important to gain
better understanding of the impact of our international economic rela-
tions on us and the rest of the world. Fabricant and use Mintz have
begun work on important aspects of this problem, and several others
of our staff are engaged in related undertakings. But we have as yet
made so little progress on the international research previously pro-
jected that our immediate need is to expand the staff rather than ini-
tiate new researches.
V
The economic future of our country is now heavily clouded by political
and military uncertainties. No one can tell what changes the future will
bring in our daily lives or what course our economic organization will
take. But in thinking of the National Bureau's research over the coming
years, it is reasonable to assume that whatever happens to hearth or
kin our political democracy will remain intact, that a considerable
measure of economic freedom will continue to be a part of our cultural
scheme, and that our national enterprise of production and distribution
will continue to be a partnership in which workers, consumers, business
firms, and other groups participate with the government. As long as
these conditions prevail there will be a need for research on the be-
havior patterns of the labor market, industrial productivity, prices and
incomes, capital formation, consumer spending, the machinery of credit,
the finances of government—in short, for scientific study of the endur-
ing features of economic life such as have engaged the Bureau's efforts
during its entire history, and that my sketch of the future seeks to ex-
tend.
Research on basic problems makes heavy demands on an investiga-
tor's time and patience, and the usefulness of its results is not always
obvious. But in the long run nothing is more practical than funda-
mental research. When the Bureau undertook its investigation of cor-
porate bond experience, no one could know that results would be
forthcoming to influence legislation on insurance companies, personal
trusts, and savings banks. Nor did anyone know at the time our project
on urban real estate finance was launched that years later the Federal
Reserve authorities would need to regulate real estate credit and that
our findings would be helpful in drafting the regulations. A large part
of the information currently compiled by governmental agencies on the
[17subjects of national income, money flows, capital formation, physical
production, and consumer credit has grown out of or been materially
influenced by the Bureau's research; but no one could know that in
advance. Our studies of the national income, which were designed to
promote the arts of peace, turned out to be extremely helpful also in
conducting the recent war. The studies by Fabricant, Long, Kendrick,
Kuznets, and others, to which I have referred in the course of this re-
port, were started years ago and yet are capable of illuminating our
most recent experiences. In planning the National Bureau's research
we therefore need not be disheartened by our inability to tell what the
world will be like several years hence. As long as we work on funda-
mental problems in the scientific spirit to whichare accustomed, we
may be confident that our researches will prove of practical value to
mankind.
Much of today's thinking runs of necessity along military lines. But
the struggle between the western democracies and communism is basi-
cally ideological, and we must not allow its military aspect to obscure
this fact. It is a grave error to regard communism as a conspiracy of an
unscrupulous clique to attain mastery of the world. Such a clique ex-
ists but its power derives from its ability to harness the idealistic im-
pulses of man. To strive for peace in the world, for justice in distribut-
ing incomes, for higher living standards, for security of job and home,
for protection against the ravages of disease and old age—these are
natural expressions of present-day culture. Communism has made
headway by promising the millennium to an anxious and partly hungry
world, while exploiting our every shortcoming and diverting attention
from our constructive achievements. Over a large part of the earth in-
formed economic communication has broken down, and one of the
most vital needs of our time is to find the means of reconstituting it.
But fundamental economic research must also be pushed with vigor,
so that our children may be better equipped with the knowledge needed
to solve economic and political problems than were their fathers and
teachers.
Arthur F. Burns
Director of Research
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